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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw - EQUAL PnoTECTION - DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
NEGROES IN STATE RECREATION FACILITIES-Three suits were brought to obtain
injunctions to prevent racial segregation at public bathing beaches, bathhouses, and swimming pools. Because the cases raised the same legal issue they
were consolidated for trial. The plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings.
Held, motion denied. The segregation of Negroes and whites at bathing beaches,
bathhouses and swimming pools does not per se deny to Negroes any rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Lonesome
11. Maxwell, (D.C. Md. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 193.
Since the historic case of Plessy 11. Ferguson1 the "separate but equal" doctrine has been widely used as authority for the maintenance of racial segregation.
This doctrine, in brief, is that there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because of enforced separation so long as the facilities provided for both
races are equal. How long the doctrine will continue to have any vitality is
now a matter of considerable speculation. In the recent case of Brown 11. Board

1163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). However, Plessy v. Ferguson was not the
first case which dealt with segregation. The court in deciding Plessy v. Ferguson relied
heavily on the old case of Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849), which
upheld segregation of the races in public schools in Boston. See generally, Frank and
Munro, ''The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Laws,'" 50 CoL. L.
R.Ev. 131 (1950).
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of Education,.2 the Supreme Court brought to a dramatic close the application
of the doctrine in the field of public education, specifically overruling Plessy 11.
Ferguson.3 The opinion in the Brown case, however, indicates an •effort on the
part of the Court to limit the scope of the decision to the public education field. 4
Whether the Brown case should be applied to a case involving segregation at
public recreational facilities was the problem faced by the court in the principal
case. It is also a problem that will be widely discussed until it is directly presented to the Supreme Court.5 In the past, the Plessy case has served as the
authority for cases involving segregation in the enjoyment of public recreational
facilities just as it has in the public education and transportation cases.6 Where
there was inequality in the facilities provided for the segregated races, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was found. 7 Where the facilities were
equal, segregation was lawful. 8 As recognized in the principal case, however,
the function and nature of public recreation cause it to differ inherently from
public education.9 Public education is compulsory, while recreation is by its
very nature voluntary; public education plays a substantial role in the development of our society, while the contribution of recreation is relatively small.
Although these factors in themselves might allow a court to distinguish the two
activities, it would seem that the same social, legal, and psychological reasons
which led the Court to its decision in the Brown case would apply to the
recreational field. 10 It was said in the Brown case that, ''To separate [Negroes]
2 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). In a companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693 (1954), the Court declared that segregation in public schools in
the District of Columbia was unconstitutional. Since the Fourteenth Amendment applies
only to state action, the Court utilized the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to
reach this result.
3 "We conclude that in the -field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." (Emphasis
added.) Brown v. Board of Education, note 2 supra, at 495. See Kauper, "Segregation in
Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson," 52 MrcH, L. REv. 1137 (1954).
4 See note 3 supra.
5 Thus far the Supreme Court has not taken advantage of the opportunities presented
to decide this question. See Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971, 74
S.Ct. 783 (1954); Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U.S. 974, 74 S.Ct. 783 (1954).
6Boyer v. Garrett, (4th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 582; Camp v. Recreation Board for
D.C., (D.C. D:C. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 10; Hayes v. Crutcher, (D.C. Tenn. 1952) 108
F. Supp. 582.
7 Kansas City, Mo. v. Williams, (8th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 47; Beal v. Holcombe,
(5th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 384, cert. den. 347 U.S. 974, 74 S.Ct. 783 (1954); Lopez
v. Seccombe, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 71 F. Supp. 769.
s See Boyer v. Garrett, and Camp v. Recreation Board for D.C., note 6 supra.
9 The court justified its decision in the principal case on two grounds: (1) the
avoidance of conflicts which might arise from racial antipathies, and (2) the achievement
of the "greatest good for the greatest number"; i.e., Negroes are more relaxed among
members of their own race than in mixed groups.
10 It is interesting to note that since the Brown case the Court has given similar
treatment to education and recreation cases. Where the lower court held for the Negroes,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Compare Wichita Falls Junior College District v.
Battle, 347 U.S. 974, 74 S.Ct. 783 (1954), with Beal v. Holcombe, note 7 supra. Where
the lower court held against the Negroes, the Supreme Court remanded the case with a
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from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."11 Although this language refers only to Negro children of school age, it may well be applied to all
Negroes, regardless of age. Though the youthful are more impressionable, racial
segregation may also generate in an adult an unhealthy attitude "unlikely ever
to be undone." Despite these factors, the decision in the principal case illustrates
how lower courts can utilize the restricting language12 of the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education to preserve for at least a time the once vital doctrine of "separate but equal."
-.___
Sanford B. Hertz, S.Ed.

direction to re-examine in light of the Brown case. Compare State ex rel. Hawkins v.
Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct. 783 (1954), with Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., note 5 supra.
11 Brown v. Board of
12 See note 3 supra.

Education, note 2 supra, at 484.

